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POLLUTION CONTROL BONDS: DEVELOPING CASE 
LAW IN THE STATES 
Richard Friedman * 
INTRODUCTION 
In 1968, Congress amended § 103 of the Internal Revenue Code 
to remove the tax-exempt status which had been accorded in-
dustrial development bonds.1 More precisely, Congress reallocated 
the federal income tax exemption, removing it from most industrial 
development bonds, but exempting certain new categories of bonds, 
including those bonds whose proceeds were to be used for the con-
struction of air or water pollution control facilities. These pollution 
control bonds have proven to be extremely popular, and since 1971 
sales volume has increased dramatically.2 The majority of states 
have legislation authorizing municipalities to issue pollutioTl control 
bonds3 and industry is clearly willing to use the bonds as a major 
* Staff Member, ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS. 
I INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 103(c). 
2 In 1971, public sales of pollution control bonds totaled $76,750,000. In 1973, sales had 
increased to $1.7 billion and by 1975 total public sales equaled $2.1 billion. The Weekly Bond 
Buyer, January 26, 1976, at I, col. 4. Emphasizing the number of variables, two economists 
have estimated that 1976 sales could total from $2.8 billion to $7.5 billion, while 1980 sales 
could total between $2 billion and $4.5 billion. Peterson and Galper, Tax Exempt Financing 
of Private Industry's Pollution Control Investment, 23 PUBLIC POLICY 81, 88 (1975) 
[hereinafter cited as Peterson and Galper). 
3 The following thirty-six states have authorized the issuance of municipal bonds to finance 
private pollution control facilities: CODE OF ALA. tit. 8, § 270 et seq. (Supp. 1973); ARIZ. REv. 
STAT. § 9-1221 et seq. (Supp. 1975); CAL. HEALTH AND SAFETY CODE § 39600 et seq. (West 1973); 
CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 32-23c et seq. (Supp. 1975); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 7001 et seq. 
(1974); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 159.25 et seq. (1972); HAWAII REV. STAT. tit. 5, § 39-125 et seq. 
(Supp. 1974); IDAHO CODE § 31-4501 et seq. (Supp. 1975); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 127, § 721 et 
seq. (Supp. 1975); IND. STAT. ANN. § 18-6-4.5-1 et seq. (1974); IOWA CODE ANN. § 419.1 et seq. 
(Supp. 1975); LA. STAT. ANN.-REV. STAT. § 39:991 et seq. (Supp. 1975); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. 
tit. 30, § 5325 et seq. (Supp. 1973); ANN. CODE OF MD. art. 41, § 266A et seq. (Supp. 1975); 
MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 121C, § 1 et seq. (Supp. 1975); MICH. STAT. ANN. § 5.3533(22) et seq. 
(Supp. 1975); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 474.01 et seq. (Supp. 1975); ANN. Mo. STAT. § 260.005 et 
seq. (Supp. 1975); NEV. REv. STAT. § 244.9191 et seq. (1973); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 40:37C - 1 et 
seq. (Supp. 1975); N.M. STAT. § 14-SO-1 et seq. (Special Supp. 1975); N.Y. GEN. MUN. LAW 
§ 850 et seq. (McKinney 1974); N.D. CENT. CODE § 40-57-01 et seq. (Supp. 1975); OHIO REv. 
CODE ANN. § 3706.01 et seq. (1971); ORE. REV. STAT. § 468.263 et seq. (1974); PA. STAT. ANN. 
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source of financing for pollution control facilities. 4 As a result, the 
bonds will, in part, determine how quickly and in what manner 
industry complies with federal, state, and local environmental regu-
lations. 
Pollution control bonds have been a steady source of litigation in 
state courts since 1971 when their use became widespread. At pres-
ent, the great majority of the states which have ruled on the bonds 
have held them valid. 5 A minority, however, hold that the bonds 
violate either the public purpose doctrine or the credit clause of the 
state constitution.6 This split can be explained by the courts' differ-
ing interpretations of the credit clause and the public purpose doc-
trine and, underlying those interpretations, a fundamental philo-
sophical difference concerning the use of public aid to induce and 
assist corporate compliance with pollution control regulations. 
The purpose of this article is to discuss the state case law on 
pollution control bonds, to analyze the majority and minority view, 
and to offer a conclusion as to a proper judicial approach. As back-
ground for that discussion, the general concept of industrial devel-
opment bonds and the 1968 tax reform which formally sanctioned 
pollution control bonds must first be discussed. 
tit. 73, § 371 et seq. (Supp. 1975); GEN. LAWS R.I. § 45-37.1-1 et seq. (Supp. 1975); S.C. CODE 
§ 14-399.21 et seq. (Supp. 1975); S.D. COMPo LAWS § 9-54-1 et seq. (Supp. 1975); TENN. CODE 
ANN. § 6-2801 et seq. (Supp. 1975); UTAH CODE ANN. § 11-17-1 etseq. (Supp. 1975); VT. STAT. 
ANN. tit. 10, § 211 et seq. (Supp. 1975); CODE OF VA. § 15.1-1373 et seq. (1973); W.VA. CODE 
§ 13-2C-1 et seq. (Supp. 1975); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 66.521(1) et seq. (Supp. 1975); WYo. STAT. 
§ 15.1-92 et seq. (Supp. 1975). Although the above statutes specifically make. mention of 
pollution control facilities as permissible projects, issuance of pollution control bonds has not 
required that express inclusion. See cases cited note 40 infra. 
• Pollution control investment by private industry in 1973 was estimated to total $6.2 
billion. Pollution control bond sales for 1973 totaled $1.8 billion, almost 30% of the projected 
total investment. Peterson and Galper, supra note 2, at 89, citing 6TH ANNUAL SURVEY OF 
POLLUTION CONTROL EXPENDITURES, McGraw-Hill Economics Dep't (1973). 
5 Eleven states have upheld pollution control bonds: Knight V. Environmental Improve-
ment Authority, 287 Ala. 15, 246 So.2d 903 (1971); Indus. Authority V. Nelson, 109 Ariz. 368, 
509 P.2d 705 (1973); State V. County Dev. Authority, 249 So.2d 6 (Fla. 1971); Wilson V. Bd. 
of County Comm'rs, 273 Md. 30, 327 A.2d 488 (1974); State ex rei. Farmers' Electric Coopera-
tive, Inc. V. State Environmental Improvement Authority, 518 S.W.2d 68 (Mo. 1975); Fickes 
V. Missoula County, 155 Mont. 258, 470 P.2d 287 (1970); State ex rei. Brennan V. Bowman, 
89 Nev. 330, 512 P.2d 1321 (1973); Kennecott Copper Corp. V. Town of Hurley, 84 N.M. 743, 
507 P.2d 1074 (1973); Harper V. Schooler, 258 S.C. 486, 189 S.E.2d 284 (1972); Nemelka V. 
Salt Lake County, 28 Utah 2d 183, 499 P.2d 862 (1972); State ex rei. Hammermill Paper CO. 
V. La Plante, 58 Wis.2d 32,205 NW.2d 784 (1973). 
• Opinion of the Justices, 359 Mass. 769, 268 N.E.2d 149 (1971) (loan of credit); Stanley v. 
Dep't of Conservation and Dev., 284 N.C. 15, 199 S.E.2d 641 (1973) (no public purpose); Port 
of Longview V. Taxpayers, 84 Wash.2d 475, 527 P.2d 263 (1974), modified, 85 Wash.2d 216, 
533 P.2d 128 (1975) (loan of credit). 
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1. INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT BONDS 
An industrial development bond is a revenue bond,7 the proceeds 
of which are used to finance the construction of industrial facilities 
for private corporations. The municipality issues the bonds in its 
name,8 uses the proceeds to erect the facility and leases it to a 
previously determined corporation. The rent is set so as to equal the 
principal and interest payments due the bondholders.9 When the 
leasehold term has expired, the rent payments have retired the 
bonds. The corporation may then have the option to renew the lease 
or purchase the facility, in either case for a nominal sum.lU Becauie 
industrial development bonds are generally revenue bonds and not 
general obligation bonds, the issuing municipality does not pledge 
its faith and credit or taxing power in support of the bonds.ll The 
bondholder must depend on the credit of the corporation using the 
bonds for payment of the principal and interest. 12 
The tax-exempt status of industrial development bonds, prior to 
the 1968 legislation, was their raison d'etre. Without the tax exemp-
tion, the bonds would offer no benefit over taxable borrowing to a 
private corporation, and could not be used by municipalities to 
induce corporate relocation. Prior to 1968, the Treasury considered 
the bonds to be an "obligation" of the issuing municipality under 
§103(a) of the Internal Revenue Code and therefore tax-exempt, 
even though the municipality did not pledge its general credit or 
) In a small number of states, the industrial development bonds have been general obliga-
tion bonds rather than revenue bonds. E.g., Albritton v. City of Winona, 181 Miss. 75, 178 
So. 799 (1938); City of Frostburg v. Jenkins, 215 Md. 9,136 A.2d 852 (1957). For purposes of 
this article, the terms "industrial development bond" and "pollution control bond" shall refer 
only to tax-exempt revenue bonds. 
K The bonds are not issued solely by municipalities. The issuing body may be the state, a 
county, or state- or county-wide pollution control authority. See note 45, infra. For purposes 
of this article, the term "municipality" shall include all of the above. 
• The rent payments may also include fees, administrative expenses, and other charges 
incurred by the issuing municipality. E.g., Uhls v. State ex rei. City of Cheyenne, 429 P.2d 
74,77 (Wyo. 1967). 
10 E.g., City of Gaylord v. Beckett, 378 Mich. 273, 144 N.W.2d 460 (1966) (option to 
purchase for $1). Note the lease used in State ex rei. Hammermill Paper Co. v. La Plante, 
58 Wis.2d 32,205 N.W.2d 784 (1973), contained in Mulcahy and Guszkowski, The Financing 
of Corporate Expansion Through Industrial Revenue Bonds, 57 MARQ. L. REV. 201, 223 (1974), 
where the corporation had three options to renew for 5 year terms at a rent of $100 per month. 
" 15 E.McQUlLLAN, MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS § 43.11 (J.LATIA, 3d ed. 1970 Rev. Vol.). 
12 Because industrial development bonds are backed by the credit rating of the borrowing 
corporation and not by the issuing municipality, they sell at a slightly higher interest rate 
than general obligation bonds. The Row Over Municipal Industrials, FORTUNE, Feb., 1968, at 
191. 
336 ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS [Vol. 5:333 
taxing power in support of the bonds. 13 Section 103(a), in turn, has 
its constitutional base in Pollack v. Farmers Loan and Trust Co., 
in which the Supreme Court held that federal taxation of municipal 
bond interest was in effect a direct federal tax on the borrowing 
power of the States and therefore a violation of the separation of 
powers doctrine.14 
Industrial development bonds first appeared in the South during 
the depression, 15 and for a number of years the concept stayed south. 
In 1961, only six southern states and Puerto Rico issued industrial 
development bonds. 18 From 1962 to 1968, however, a number of 
statistics measuring different aspects of industrial development 
bond usage all evidenced a rapid increase.17 Public sales of the bonds 
increased from $70 million in 1961 to nearly $500 million in 1966 and 
to $1.3 billion in 1967.18 Clearly, industrial development bonds were 
no longer a method used solely by developing southern states to 
finance small industrial plants. By 1967, the bonds were issued by 
more industrial states to finance large industrial projects for major 
corporations. II 
The causes of this increase in sales are clear. By financing plant 
construction with tax-exempt bonds, which sell at a lower interest 
rate than normal corporate bonds, corporations are able to save 
large sums of money.20 One commentator contended that a corpora-
tion could show a net profit simply by occupying a site financed by 
13 Rev. Rul. 54-106, 1954-1 CUM. BULL. 28. 
1. 157 U.S. 429 (1895). The validity of the holding in Pollack has been questioned. Note, 
The Continuing Debate Over the Municipal Bond Exemption: Time For a New Approach by 
Reformists, 25 SYRACUSE L. REV. 953, 958 n.26 (1974). 
" Mississippi was the first state to authorize industrial development bonds; the program, 
Balance Agriculture With Industry, was upheld in Albritton v. City of Winona, 181 Miss. 75, 
178 So. 799 (1938). 
11 114 CONGo REc. 7683 (1968). For additional statistics on pre-1963 use of industrial devel-
opment bonds, see Pinsky, State Constitutional Limitations on Public Industrial Financing: 
an Historical and Economic Approach, 111 U. PA. L. REv. 265, 326 (1963) [hereinafter cited 
as Pinsky]. 
17 For numerous statistics on industrial development bond use from 1956 to 1967, see 114 
CONGo REC. 909, 7683 (1968). 
,. 114 CONGo REC. 7683 (1968). It was estimated that private sales could be two or three 
times as great. Id. at 909 n.1. 
II See Table, Industrial Aid Financing by State 1956-1967, 114 CONGo REc. 7683 (1968); 
Table ill-Industrial Development Bonds Issued in 1967 (Large Issues Only), 114 CONGo REC. 
909 (1968). 
Z11 One commentator, discussing pollution control bonds, estimates that a corporation can 
save $300,000 over 20 years on a $1 million issue if the difference between the interest rate 
on taxables and tax-exempts is 1.5%. Ritts, Financing the Future Demand For Electric 
Energy and Pollution Control Facilities-The Tax Exempt Bond, 5 NAT. RES. LAW. 363 
(1972). 
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industrial development bonds and purchasing the bonds itself.21 A 
second major impetus to bond use was an increase in competition 
among states to attract new industry and between corporations to 
keep costs low. 22 
Notwithstanding the $800 million increase in bond sales in 1966-
1967, the bonds were proving less popular in many quarters. In late 
1967, legislation was introduced in the Senate to lift the municipal 
tax exemption from industrial development bonds.23 The ensuing 
Congressional debate revealed that some states and corporations 
felt obligated to issue and use the bonds but believed them to be 
counterproductive.24 Opponents of industrial development bonds 
argued that the rapidly increasing volume of these bonds was caus-
ing the interest rate on all municipal bonds to rise, thus driving up 
municipal costs for roads, sewers, schools, etc. 25 In addition, by 
1968, over forty states had authorized industrial development 
bonds, and members of Congress repeatedly pointed out that the 
individual municipality issuing bonds no longer had any competi-
tive advantage regarding corporate relocation decisions.28 In effect, 
opponents argued that Congress, by severely limiting the number of 
industrial development bonds, would be saving the municipalities 
from themselves.27 
The federal government also had its own interests to protect. By 
allowing municipalities to pass on the benefits of their tax-exempt 
21 Note, Industrial Development Bonds: Judicial Construction vs. Plant Construction, 15 
U. FLA. L. REv. 262, 270 (1962). One result of the 1968 reform legislation was to prohibit a 
corporation from holding the bonds and being a "substantial user" of the facilities. INT. REv. 
CODE OF 1954, § 103(c)(7). Nor are rent payments still deductible as a business expense. Rev. 
Rul. 68-590, 1968-2 CUM. BULL. 66. 
22 For legislative recognition of the interstate competition factor see, WIS. STAT. § 66.521(1) 
(Supp. 1975). 
23 S.2635, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (Nov. 8, 1967) . 
.. See 114 CONGo REC. 905-07 (1968). For Congressional discussion of industrial develop-
ment bonds, see generally 114 CONGo REC. 905, 7681, 8145 (1968). For a comprehensive discus-
sion of the 1968 legislation and the policy questions raised by industrial development bonds, 
see McDaniel, Federal Income Taxation of Industrial Bonds: The Public Interest, 1 URBAN 
LAW 157 (1969). 
'" The Investment Banker's Association estimated that the 1966-1967 $800 million increase 
in industrial development bond sales raised the cost of local government borrowing with 
general obligation bonds by about 1/4 of 1 per cent. 114 CONGo REC. 7681 (1968) (Remarks of 
Senator Nelson). 
" 114 CONGo REC. 8147, 8149, 8150 (1968). 
27 North Carolina illustrates the approach/avoidance problems some states had with in-
dustrial development bonds. Although the North Carolina legislature authorized issuance of 
the bonds, it passed a second bill at the same time asking the President and the other 49 
states to urge Congress to remove the bond's tax-exempt status. Mitchell V. Indus. Dev. Fin. 
Authority, 273 N.C. 137, 146, 159 S.E.2d 745, 748 (1968). 
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status to private corporations, the federal government was spending 
tax revenue to subsidize the cost of building private industrial 
plants.2M In addition to causing an absolute loss of tax revenue, the 
Treasury also argued that industrial development bonds were fis-
cally inefficient; the federal government lost the entire amount of 
the tax which would have been collected on the interest paid on the 
bonds, while the corporation gained the difference between the in-
terest rate on tax-exempt and taxable bonds. The Treasury esti-
mated that the dollar loss to the federal government could be three 
times as great as the dollar benefit to the corporation using the 
bonds.29 
The resulting legislation, contained in the Revenue and Expendi-
ture Control Act of 1968 [the Act],30 is not a blanket restriction on 
all future use of industrial development bonds. It is an attempt to 
limit a municipality's power to pass on the benefits of its tax-
exempt status to a private corporation while maintaining certain 
types of tax-exempt bonds which Congress presumably considered 
most beneficial. The Act retains the tax-exempt status for two 
classes of industrial development bonds. First, the Act creates an 
exemption for small issues and small projects. Congress heard argu-
ments that industrial development bonds are still a necessity for 
small communities and rural areas. 31 In an apparent compromise, 
the Act provides a tax exemption for issues that are $1 million or 
2M The tax expenditure theory regards each income tax deduction as revenue lost to the 
federal government; thus, each tax deduction is seen as equivalent to a positive appropriation 
of federal funds by Congress. As applied to the tax exemption for industrial development and 
pollution control bonds, the result is the same as if Congress had made a positive appropria-
tion specifically to finance industrial plants and private pollution control facilities. The tax 
deduction can then be analyzed for fiscal efficiency and effectiveness as would any statutory 
appropriation. For application of the tax-expenditure theory to accelerated depreciation de-
ductions for pollution control facilities, see McDaniel and Kaplinsky, The Use of the Federal 
Income Tax System to Combat Air and Water Pollution: A Case Study in Tax Expenditures, 
1 ENV. AFF. 12 (1971). 
2U 114 CONGo REC. 905, 908-09 (1968). This loss of funds is not peculiar to industrial 
development or pollution control bonds. The tax exemption for interest on municipal bonds 
will probably cost the federal government $4.7 billion in lost revenue in fiscal 1976 while states 
and cities will save less than $3 billion. The $1.7 billion difference goes directly to the 
bondholders as tax-free income. Crown, Federal Subsidy For Municipal Bonds: An Appraisal, 
TAX NOTES, Oct. 20, 1975, at 27, citing Estimates of Federal Tax Expenditures, Treasury 
Department and Joint Committee on Internal Revenue (July 8, 1975). The Crown article 
discusses the possibility of substituting a taxable municipal bond and a direct federal subsidy 
to municipalities for the present indirect subsidy through tax exemption. For other discussion 
of the taxable municipal bond, see Note, The Continuing Debate Ouer the Municipal Bond 
Exemption: Time For a New Approach by Reformists, 25 SYRACUSE L. REV. 953 (1974). 
:10 Pub. L. No. 90-364, 82 Stat. 251, amending INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 103. 
31 114 CONGo REC. 7687 (1968) (Remarks of Senator Fulbright). 
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less, regardless of the total size of the particular project, and issues 
as large as $5 million, if the total cost of the project is $5 million or 
less. 32 This "small issues exemption" has been supported by a com-
mentator otherwise critical of industrial development bonds as en-
couraging the most economically' beneficial projects.33 
The second statutory exception concerns bonds whose proceeds 
are to be used for a variety of specific projects such as sports facili-
ties, airports, mass commuting facilities, and air or water pollution 
control projects. 34 The projects may be of unlimited size and the 
bond proceeds may be used by a private corporation. However, un-
like the typical pre-1968 project, i. e., private industrial facilities, 
the §103(c)(4) projects must be available on a regular basis for 
general public use or be part of a facility so used.3s Air and water 
pollution control facilities are an exception and are treated as serv-
ing a general use even though the facilities are built for a private 
plant. 36 Thus, since 1968 the major opportunity left for a private 
corporation to use industrial development bonds to finance plant 
construction costs in excess of $5 million has been through the ex-
emption for pollution control facilities. 
II. POLLUTION CONTROL BONDS 
Of all the exceptions allowed under § 103(c)(4)-(5), the most 
heavily used has been the exception for pollution control facilities. 37 
In 1975, total public sales of the bonds rose to $2.1 billion, $800 
million more than the total of all industrial development bonds sold 
in 1967.38 
Although pollution control bonds are tax-exempt by virtue of 
§ 103(c)(4)(F) of the Internal Revenue Code, they are issued in 
individual states as a result of state enabling legislation. The bonds 
are issued under three different statutory schemes. In the least com-
mon scheme, the state statute under which the bonds are issued 
32 INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 103(c)(6). Senator Curtis has introduced legislation to raise 
the $1 million ceiling to $10 million, S.1949, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (June 16, 1975). 
" Note, The Limited Tax-Exempt Status of Interest on Industrial Development Bond.~ 
Under Subsection 103(c) of the Internal Revenue Code, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1649, 1660 (1972). 
". INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 103(c)(4)-(5). 
:15 Treas. Reg. § 1.103-8(a)(2) (1972). 
". Id. 
'" 1974 sales of industrial bonds for non-pollution control purposes were $337 million com-
pared to $2.1 billion for pollution control bonds. The Weekly Bond Buyer, Jan. 13, 1975, at 
1, col. 1. 
:IK The Weekly Bond Buyer, Jan. 26, 1976, at 1, col. 4. 
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contains no express mention of pollution control facilities. 3D Typi-
cally, such a statute was passed before 1968 to authorize industrial 
development bonds and finance plant construction. Although the 
statutory definition of "project" does not expressly authorize the 
construction of pollution control facilities, several courts have held 
that a definition which does include "enlargements," "improve-
ments," or "additions" is sufficiently broad to include authorization 
for their construction. 40 
The two more common approaches are either to amend a preexist-
ing industrial development bond statute to include express authori-
zation for pollution control bonds,41 or to pass an independent stat-
ute authorizing the issuance of revenue bonds for pollution control 
facilities. 42 The latter group of statutes normally follow this pattern: 
legislative findings as to the existence of pollution and the desirabil-
ity of providing alternative methods of financing the necessary pri-
vate pollution control facilities;43 definitions of pollution and pollu-
tion control facilities;44 a description of the powers of the issuing 
body;45 a description of the type of bonds authorized;48 and other 
regulations as to state tax exemptions47 or required certification by 
federal or state agencies. 48 
Numerous cases have questioned whether this enabling legisla-
'" E.g., REV. CODE OF MONT. § 11·4101 et seq. (1968), as amended, (Supp. 1974). 
'" Fickes v. Missoula County, 155 Mont. 258, 270, 470 P.2d 287, 293 (1970); State v. County 
Dev. Authority, 249 So.2d 6, 10 (Fla. 1971). 
" E.g., ANN. CODE OF MD. art. 41, § 266A et seq. (Supp. 1975), amending ANN. CODE OF 
MD. art. 41, § 266A et seq. (1971) . 
., E.g., ANN. Mo. STAT. § 260.005 et seq. (Supp. 1975). 
'" E.g., CAL. HEALTH AND SAFETY CODE § 39601 (West 1973); IDAHO CODE § 31·4502 (Supp. 
1975). For legislative findings stressing use of pollution control bonds as a means of retaining 
present industry and attracting new industry, see ANN. CODE OF MD. art. 41, § 266B(a)·(b) 
(Supp. 1975). 
" "Pollution" has been broadly defined as, "[a]ny form of environmental pollution in· 
cluding, but not limited to, water pollution, air pollution, land pollution, solid waste poilu· 
tion, thermal pollution, radiation contamination, or noise pollution as determined by the 
various standards prescribed by this state or the federal government." IDAHO CODE § 31· 
4503(d) (Supp. 1975). For a detailed definition of "pollution control facilities," see CAL. 
HEALTH AND SAFETY CODE § 39603(e) (West 1973). 
" The issuing body may be a state authority, as in Missouri: ANN. Mo. STAT. § 260.010 
(Supp. 1975); or a county or municipality: ANN. CODE OF MD. art. 41, § 266B (1971). . 
" Those statutes which authorize revenue bonds contain a disclaimer of municipal liability 
such as the following: "[s]uch revenue bonds shall not be secured by the full faith and credit 
or the taxing power of the state of Idaho or of any political subdivision thereof, and such 
limitation shall be plainly printed on the face of each such revenue bond." IDAHO CODE, § 
31·4505 (Supp. 1975). 
" E.g., IDAHO CODE § 31·4515 (Supp. 1975). 
" E.g., CAL. HEALTH AND SAFETY CODE § 39615 (West Supp. 1975). 
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tion violates a variety of state constitutional provisions. Although 
each case contains its own unique set of issues, the outcome is nearly 
always determined by the judicial response to two particular issues. 
The first issue is whether the bonds violate that section of a typical 
state constitution which prohibits municipalities from loaning their 
credit in aid of private corporations. The second is whether pollution 
control bonds serve a public purpose. The remainder of this article 
will discuss how state courts have confronted these two issues. 49 
A. Credit Restrictions 
In the context of municipal bonds, the latter half of the 19th 
century has assumed historic proportions as the "railroad bond 
era." It was during this period that many municipalities issued and 
sold general obligation bonds and loaned the proceeds to private 
corporations. The principal recipients of the funds were railroads, 
which municipalities wanted to encourage to lay track as quickly as 
possible within the state.50 State courts applied the traditional pub-
lic purpose test to the bonds and did not find them wanting. 51 When 
a number of railroads went bankrupt and left the municipalities 
liable for the bonds, states began to pass various constitutional 
restrictions aimed at preventing other such loans. The Arizona 
credit restdction is a good example of a constitutional restriction 
aimed at several "railroad bond" practices: 
Neither the State, nor any county, city, town, municipality, or other 
subdivision of the State shall ever give or loan its credit in the aid of, 
or make any donation or grant, by subsidy or otherwise, to any individ-
ual, association, or corporation, or become a subscriber to, or a share-
holder in, any company or corporation, or become a joint owner with any 
" Although the credit restriction and the public purpose doctrine are the principal issues, 
several others arise frequently; whether the bonds exceed the municipal debt limit, e.g., 
Harper v. Schooler, 258 S.C. 486, 494, 189 S.E.2d 284, 288 (1972); whether the project is a 
"work of internal improvement" which the state constitution prohibits the state from partici-
pating in, e.g., State ex rei. Hammermill Paper Co. v. La Plante, 58 Wis.2d 32, 59, 205 
N .W.2d 784, 800 (1973); state tax questions, e.g., State ex rei. Farmers' Electric Cooperative, 
Inc. v. State Environmental Improvement Authority, 518 S.W.2d 68, 75 (Mo. 1975); and 
whether pollution control facilities fall within the statutory definition of "project", see cases 
cited supra note 40. 
50 See Pinsky, supra note 16, at 277; Note, State Constitutional Limitations on a Munici-
pality's Power to Appropriate Funds or Extend Credit to Individuals and Associations, 108 
U. PA. L. REV. 95, 97 (1959) [hereinafter cited as State Constitutional Limitations]. 
51 State Constitutional Limitations, supra note 50, at 97; Sharpless v. Mayor of Philadel-
phia, 21 Pa. 147 (1853). 
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person, company or corporation, except as to such ownerships as may 
accrue to the State by operation or provision of law.52 
Of the several restrictions contained in the Arizona credit clause, 
the pollution control bond cases deal principally with that part 
which prohibits a municipality from giving or loaning its credit in 
aid of a private corporation. No disagreement exists in the case law 
that the bonds can be seen as a loan53 and that the loan does aid a 
private corporation.54 In the majority view, and that of the court in 
Port of Longview, Cowlitz County v. Taxpayers, the only case to 
hold that pollution control revenue bonds are prohibited by credit 
restrictions,55 the determinative issue is whether that loan to a pri-
vate corporation is a loan of municipal credit. 
As did earlier cases involving industrial development bonds,56 the 
pollution control bond cases which have decided the credit issue on 
its merits have interpreted credit restrictions as prohibiting the 
issuing municipality from obligating or indebting itself through 
loans to private corporationsY The credit issue in most of these 
cases is reduced to determining whether the tax-exempt pollution 
control bonds will indebt or obligate the issuing municipality. 58 The 
" ARIZ. CONST. art. 9, § 7. 
53 See, e.g., Indust. Dev. Authority v. Nelson, 109 Ariz. 368, 371, 509 P.2d 705, 708 (1973); 
Harper v. Schooler, 258 S.C. 486, 491, 189 S.E.2d 284, 286 (1972). 
" See, e.g., State v. County Dev. Authority, 249 So.2d 6, 12 (Fla. 1971); Opinion of the 
Justices, 359 Mass. 769, 268 N.E.2d 149 (1971). 
'" 84 Wash.2d 475, 527 P.2d 263 (1974), modified, 85 Wash.2d 216, 533 P.2d 128 (1975) 
[hereinafter cited as Port of Longview]. In Opinion of the Justices, 359 Mass. 769, 268 
N .E.2d 149 (1971), the court held that the statute did violate the credit restriction; however, 
the Massachusetts statute was unusual in that it employed general obligation bonds rather 
than the more prevalent revenue bonds. In this sense, Port of Longview is the only case to 
hold that pollution control bonds are barred by state credit restrictions. 
, .. There is a good deal of state case law regarding industrial development bonds. For a list, 
see Mitchell v. Indus. Dev. Fin. Authority, 273 N.C. 137, 148-49, 159 S.E.2d 745,753 (1968). 
For typical discussions of credit restrictions, see Elliot v. McNair, 250 S.C. 75, 156 S.E.2d 
421 (1967); Allen v. Tooele County, 21 Utah 2d 383, 445 P.2d 994 (1968); Uhls v. State, 429 
P.2d 74 (Wyo. 1967). 
57 Harper v. Schooler, 258 S.C. 486, 495, 189 S.E.2d 284, 288 (1972); State ex rei. Brennan 
v. Bowman, 89 Nev. 330, 333, 512 P.2d 1321,1322-23 (1973); Kennecott Copper Corp. v. Town 
of Hurley, 84 N.M. 743, 746, 507 P.2d 1074, 1077 (1973); Opinion of the Justices, 359 Mass. 
769, 773, 268 N.E.2d 149, 152 (1971). In two cases no violation of the credit restriction was 
found on the ground that the particular issuing entity was not barred by the clause. Knight 
v. Environmental Improvement Authority, 287 Ala. 15, 19, 246 So.2d 903, 905 (1971) (public 
corporation neither "state" nor "political subdivision"); State ex rei. Hammermill Paper Co. 
v. La Plante, 58 Wis.2d 32, 61-62, 205 N.W.2d 784, 801-02 (1973) (municipality not bound 
by constitutional restriction on acts of state). 
" A number of courts have taken a different route, positing that bonds which are issued 
for a public purpose are an exception to the constraints of the credit restriction. Fickes v. 
Missoula County, 155 Mont. 258, 267-68, 470 P.2d 287, 291-92 (1970); Kennecott Copper 
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reasoning of the Nevada Supreme Court in State ex ret. Brennan v. 
Bowman59 is typical: 
It is asserted that the Revenue Bond Law contravenes the prohibitions 
of Nev. Const. art. 8, §§ 9 and 10, relative to loans of public credit. Since 
the Revenue Bond Law specifically forbids a charge against the 
County's credit or taxing powers, precludes County liability for the 
bonds and interest coupons, and bars County contribution towards the 
acquisition cost of the project, this challenge to the law also must 
fail. . . . Inasmuch as the bonds are payable only from income to be 
derived from leasing the pollution control facilities, and no resort can 
be had against the County or its taxpayers, the County is not lending 
its credit in breach of the constitutional proscription. so 
The Brennan interpretation of the Nevada credit restriction is 
consistent with the history and purpose of credit restrictions in gen-
eral. The original credit restrictions were a reaction to a particular 
state of affairs: massive municipal debts caused by municipal loans 
to private corporations. Revenue bonds, one of whose primary fea-
tures was limited municipal liability, were not widely used until the 
Depression.61 Thus, by construing the credit restrictions so as to 
focus on the possibility of municipal liability, the courts have not 
expanded the restrictions' scope beyond that originally intended by 
their drafters. 62 
In Port of Longview, the Washington Supreme Court, however, 
struck down a statute authorizing pollution control bonds by read-
ing the credit restriction more broadly than as a prohibition against 
certain types of municipal debt. The Washington credit restriction 
Corp. v. Town of Hurley, 84 N.M. 743, 746, 507 P.2d 1074, 1077 (1973) [hereinafter cited as 
Kennecott]; Indust. Dev. Authority v. Nelson, 109 Ariz. 368, 373-74, 509 P.2d 705, 710-11 
(1973) [hereinafter cited as Nelson]; State ex rel. Farmers' Electric Cooperative, Inc. v. 
State Environmental Improvement Authority, 518 S.W.2d 68, 74 (Mo. 1975). All have pro-
ceeded to find a public purpose and uphold the bonds. Note Kennecott, where the court 
appeared to require both a finding of public purpose and no municipal obligation. Note also 
City of Tempe v. Pilot Properties Inc., 22 Ariz. App. 356, 527 P.2d 515 (1974)', a non-pollution 
control bond case, where the court expressly refused to make an exception for "public pur-
pose" bonds and interpreted Nelson as based on a finding of no municipal obligation. 
The "public purpose" exception to credit restrictions has been criticized for depriving the 
restriction of its original purpose: to provide a stricter limit than the public purpose doctrine 
on municipal assistance to private corporations. State Constitutional Limitations, supra note 
50 at 111; Comment, State Constitutional Provisions Prohibiting The Loaning Of Credit To 
Private Enterprise-A Suggested Analysis, 41 U. COLO. L. REV. 135, 139 (1969). 
59 89 Nev. 330, 512 P.2d 1321 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Brennan] . 
• 11 [d. at 333, 512 P.2d at 1322-23 . 
• 1 Fordham, Revenue Bond Sanctions, 42 COLUM. L. REV. 395, 400 (1942). 
" For judicial cognizance of this history, see Indust. Dev. Authority v. Nelson, 109 Ariz. 
368,372,509 P.2d 705,709 (1973). 
344 ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS [Vol. 5:333 
provides that a municipality shall not "loan its money or credit" in 
aid of any corporation63 (emphasis added). In Port of Longview, the 
court held that pollution control bonds constituted both types of 
loans. The facts giving rise to the case are slightly different from the 
typical pollution control bond case. Normally, the municipality 
owns the facility and leases it to the corporation. In Port of 
Longview, the corporation received a lump sum from the municipal-
ity to finance construction costs. This lump sum bought the munici-
pality a leasehold interest in the to-be-constructed facilities. The 
corporation then subleased the facilities back from the municipality 
and the rent payments on this sublease went to retire the bonds. 
Prior to Port of Longview, Washington aligned itself with those 
states which had held industrial development bonds unconstitu-
tional. 64 In Port of Longview, the municipal respondents apparently 
anticipated similar constitutional difficulties and thus argued that 
this transaction was a lease-sublease and not a loan. 
The court demonstrated, first, that the municipality was making 
a loan of its money. As the first element of proof, the court charac-
terized the monies raised by the bonds and ultimately used by the 
corporation as "municipal funds."65 This conclusion was based on 
the finding that "[t]he bonds were issued by the municipal corpo-
ration, and the proceeds from their sale came into the municipal 
treasury."66 In addition, the court found that the bonds were liabili-
ties of the issuing municipalities. Although the court recognized 
that the bonds were to be retired solely from the corporate rent 
payments and not from taxes, it appeared to find persuasive the fact 
that the bonds themselves stated that the issuing municipality obli-
gated itself to pay the principal,61 
As its second element of proof, the court concluded that the trans-
" WASH. CONST. art. 8, § 7. 
" See Hogue v. Port of Seattle, 54 Wash. 2d 799, 341 P.2d 171 (1959), in which the Washing-
ton court held that the use of eminent domain to assemble land for private industrial develop-
ment was for a private purpose and therefore invalid . 
.. Port of Longview v. Taxpayers, 84 Wash.2d 475, _, 527 P.2d 263, 266 (1974), modified, 
85 Wash.2d 216, 533 P.2d 128 (1975) . 
.. [d. 
" [d. The court appears to take this statement of obligation literally. It does not consider 
the statutory limitation of municipal liability, see note 74 infra, which also must appear on 
the face of the bond. The court noted that in the event of default, the bondholders may 
proceed only against the corporate owner-sublessee, but characterized that as a "contractual 
affirmative defense" and did not discuss it further. 84 Wash.2d at _,527 P.2d at 265. The 
statement on the face of the bond "obligating" the municipality to pay the principal possibly 
refers only to an obligation to pass on all payments received from the corporation. 
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action was not a lease-sublease, but a loan. The court noted that one 
of the participating corporations had requested and received a pri-
vate revenue ruling from the Internal Revenue Service which stated 
that the lump sum payment received by the corporation from the 
municipality would not be treated as rental income and therefore 
was not taxable. 8s The court found, in addition, that the municipal-
ity had no intent to assert a possessory interest in the facilities; the 
facilities were of use only at the individual plant where constructed; 
and the municipality had a security interest in the building which 
it acquired by providing the financing. Since the bonds involved 
municipal funds and were a loan to a private corporation, their 
issuance constituted a violation of the credit restriction. 
This portion of Port of Longview raises a number of questions. 
Although several courts ruling on industrial development bonds 
have also characterized the funds loaned as "municipal funds,"89 
this conclusion is arguably based more on form than substance. 
Pollution control bonds are normally issued and sold to finance 
individual predetermined projects.70 In this sense, the proceeds from 
the bond sale are already earmarked for a specific project. Although 
the court did not discuss it, the Washington enabling statute pro-
vided that the proceeds of any sale of bonds could only be used for 
the purpose for which they were issued,71 Consequently, the munici-
pality can be seen as the custodian of a special fund which is not 
commingled with municipal or public funds. The Washington stat-
ute provided a method for further reducing the municipality's role 
by allowing for the appointment of a trustee with whom all of the 
proceeds of the bond sale and all of the revenue raised as rent could 
be deposited.72 Thus, although the funds loaned do move from bond-
holder to municipality to corporation, the municipality serves pri-
marily as a conduit. 
8M 84 Wash. 2d at _, 527 P.2d at 267 (1975). The court's conclusion that the transaction 
is not a lease· sublease but a loan is identical to the view of the Internal Revenue Service 
regarding industrial development bonds: the corporation is treated as the owner of the facili· 
ties and not a lessee. Rev. Rul. 68·590, 1968·2, CUM. BULL. 66 . 
.. State ex rei. Beck v. City of York, 164 Neb. 223, 229, 82 N.W.2d 269, 273 (1957); State 
ex rei. Sax be v. Brand, 176 Ohio St. 44, 52, 197 N.E.2d 328,333 (1964); State v. Town of N. 
Miami, 59 So.2d 779, 787 (Fla. 1952). In each case the bonds were held invalid. 
71' Normally, the corporation approaches the municipality and requests that it issue bonds 
to finance a particular project. See, e.g., the procedure described in Wilson v. Bd. of Comm'rs, 
273 Md. 30, 37, 327 A.2d 488,492 (1974). Note also N.J. STAT. ANN. § 40:37C·ll (Supp. 1975), 
which requires as a condition precedent to local authorization of a particular bond issue that 
the particular facilities to be financed be certified as pollution control facilities. 
71 REV. CODE OF WASH. ANN. § 70.95A.OBO (1975). 
72 [d. at §§ 70.95A.050(5). 
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A similar conflict between form and substance attaches to the 
court's determination that the bonds were municipal obligations in 
any more than the nominal sense. Although the Washington credit 
clause prohibits a municipality from loaning its money or credit, the 
court did not give any consideration to the fact that the municipal-
ity has no direct financial interest in seeing the pollution control 
bonds fully retired. The Washington statute contained the usual 
caveat that the bonds were to be secured solely by the revenue 
derived from the sale or lease of the facility and would not constitute 
a charge against the municipality's general credit or taxing power.73 
The courts which have not found a violation of credit restrictions 
have not denied that the transaction was a loan. These courts, how-
ever, have gone on to determine whether the municipality was liable 
for that loan. In Port of Longview, the court was satisfied with much 
less: a violation of the credit restriction exists if the bonds were 
issued in the municipality's name and if a private corporation bor-
rowed the proceeds of those bonds. As a result, the Washington 
court's interpretation of the credit restriction is considerably 
broader in scope then the original purpose which these restrictions 
were intended to serve. 
The court read the second half of the credit restriction, which 
prohibited loans of credit, equally broadly. Noting a House commit-
tee report which stated that the increased number of municipal 
bonds was causing the interest rate on tax exempts to rise,74 the 
court concluded: 
The result of the state's participation in this form of financing [i. e. 
pollution control bonds] cannot be said to have no impact on the state's 
ability to finance its other governmental obligations. To the extent that 
these transactions affect the state's ability to carry out its other func-
tions, it is a loan of the state's credit in a very real sense.75 
The court's conclusion that the bonds were a loan of credit be-
cause their issuance has a detrimental effect on the state's ability 
to finance other activities proves too much. Although the court was 
correct as to the effect of an increase in the volume of municipal 
bonds on the tax-exempt interest rate, the rise in interest rates is 
primarily a function of the economics of the bond market. 76 Were 
7:1 Id. at § 70.95A.040(1). 
" H.R. REP. No. 413, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 172-73 (1969). 
" 84 Wash.2d at _, 527 P.2d at 269 (1974), modified, 85 Wash.2d 216, 533 P.2d 128 
(1975). 
" Surrey, Federal Income Taxation of State and Local Government Obligations, 36 TAX 
POLICY 5 (May-June, 1969). 
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the demand for tax-exempt bonds more elastic, the issuance of pol-
lution control bonds would cause little or no rise in the interest rate. 
The bonds would then have a proportionally smaller impact on the 
state's ability to carry on its other functions. Using the Port of 
Longview definition of a loan of credit, the existence of a constitu-
tional violation would depend on the changing structure of the tax-
exempt market. Another court, presented with the argument that 
pollution control bonds were invalid because they would compete 
with traditional tax-exempt bonds to the detriment of the latter, 
refused to treat the issue as being judicially cognizable.77 The court 
held that the decision to issue pollution control bonds, in the con-
text of their effect on other municipal bonds, is a question of public 
policy to be decided by the legislature. 
One commentator has suggested that the result in Port of 
Longview may be explained by factors not readily apparent from the 
opinion itself.78 This commentator suggests that during oral argu-
ment the court indicated that the bonds would benefit only large 
corporations and that the court elsewhere had indicated its desire 
to see the state use strong environmental laws as a means of insuring 
compliance with pollution control regulations.79 The Port of 
Longview opinion specifically states that municipalities will receive 
nothing to which they were not already entitled by law,80 and the 
court also noted that the private corporations involved would gain 
"extraordinary financial benefits"81 if the bonds were declared con-
stitutional. This evidence of the court's political opposition to the 
bonds combined with a rather shallow interpretation of the state 
credit restriction indicate that the court was using the credit clause 
as a means for reaching a desired result. As will be seen in the next 
section, this approach is tantamount to applying the credit restric-
tion as a form of public purpose test. 
B. Public Purpose Doctrine 
The contrast between the scope of the credit restriction and that 
77 State ex rei. Farmers' Electric Cooperative, Inc. v. State Environmental Improvement 
Authority, 518 S.W.2d 68, 76 (Mo. 1975). 
1M Note, State Constitutions-Debt Limitations-Municipality's Issuance of Revenue 
Bonds To Finance Private Pollution Control Facilities Violates State Constitution, 50 WASH. 
L. REV. 440 (1975). 
" Id. at 468-71. 
.. Port of Longview v. Taxpayers, 84 Wash.2d 475, _. 527 P.2d 263,267 (1974), modified, 
85 Wash.2d 216, 533 P.2d 128 (1975) . 
.. 84 Wash. 2d at _,527 P.2d at 271. 
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of the public purpose doctrine is striking. For at least the majority 
of courts ruling on pollution control bonds, credit clauses are treated 
as narrow restrictions aimed at a specific evil: private speculation 
with general tax funds. The scope of review, consequently, is limited 
to the relationship of the public and private parties, the nature and 
extent of any commitment of public funds, and the existence of 
statutory and contractual limitations of municipal liability. On the 
other hand, for all of the state courts ruling on pollution control 
bonds, the public purpose doctrine is less of a precise legal doctrine 
than a broad political premise which acts as a basic limit on nearly 
every aspect of municipal government. That political premise is the 
well-accepted principle that any exercise of municipal power, in-
cluding the power to tax and issue bonds, must serve a public pur-
pose.82 
The "public purpose" 'limitation on the power to tax and issue 
bonds first appeared in Sharpless u. Mayor of PhiladelphiaY The 
Pennsylvania legislature had authorized Philadelphia to purchase 
shares of railroad stock and to raise the necessary funds by obtain-
ing loans on the city's credit. A taxpayer brought suit and argued 
that the railroad bonds were invalid on the ground that they were 
taxation for a private purpose. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court 
held to the contrary, and in the process of so holding commented 
on the power to tax: "[t]axation is a mode of raising revenue for 
public purposes."84 Having stated this, the court described the judi-
ciary's role in determining public purpose as being an extremely 
limited one. "For us it is enough to know that the city may have a 
public interest in [the railroads], and that there is not a palpable 
and clear absence of all possible interest perceptible by every mind 
at the first blush."85 
In Loan Association u. Topeka,86 the Supreme Court adopted the 
public purpose doctrine of Sharpless, but not the hands-off attitude 
of the Pennsylvania court. The Court struck down a Kansas statute 
which authorized Topeka to issue bonds and donate the proceeds to 
a private manufacturer to encourage it to locate within the city. 
Although the fourteenth amendment had been ratified six years 
earlier, the Court did not attribute the public purpose doctrine to 
" 56 AM.JUR. 2d Municipal Corporations § 229 (1971); 2 E.McQUILLAN, MUNICIPAL 
(CORPORATIONS § 10.31 (F.ELLARD 3d ed. 1966 Rev. Vol.). 
" 21 P". 147 (1853) [hereinafter cited as Sharpless]. 
" [d. at 169 . 
., [d. at 172. 
" 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 655 (1874). 
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the requirements of the due process clause. Instead, as did the Penn-
sylvania court in Sharpless, the Supreme Court intuited a public 
purpose doctrine from a series of truisms concerning the state's 
power to taxY It was not until the Supreme Court decided Green 
v. Fraziers8 some fifty years later that the due process clause was 
established as the source of the doctrine. 
Definitions of public purpose are infrequently stated. In Green v. 
Frazier, the Court noted a judicial tendency to avoid defining public 
purpose, and instead to determine each case on its own particular 
circumstances.89 Some broad definition is possible, however. If the 
underlying rationale for the concept of a public purpose is that a 
municipality is a public entity, endowed with a public trust,90 then 
the legal doctrine is the judicial requirement that a municipality act 
consistently with that public trust. The area within which taxation 
is permissible is roughly coextensive with the limits of the state 
police power: a municipal act has a public purpose when it contrib-
utes to the health, welfare, and safety of the public. 91 Consequently, 
the similarity between the public purpose doctrine and the require-
ments of substantive due process is not coincidental.92 Both doc-
" "When [taxation) is prostituted to objects in no way connected with the public interests 
or welfare, it ceases to be taxation and becomes plunder." Sharpless v. Mayor of Philadelphia, 
21 Pa. 147, 169 (1853). "This power [to tax) can as readily be employed against one class of 
individuals and in favor of another, so as to ruin the one class and give unlimited wealth and 
prosperity to the other, if there is no implied limitation of the uses for which the power may 
be exercised." Loan Ass'n v. Topeka, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 655, 664 (1874). 
" 253 U.S. 233 (1920). This case did not concern state aid to private corporations; on the 
contrary, several North Dakota statutes were challenged which enabled the state to directly 
engage in a number of private enterprises. The Supreme Court upheld the legislation, return-
ing to the deferential public purpose test of Sharpless. "When the constituted authority of 
the State undertakes to exert the taxing power, and the question of the validity of its action 
is brought before this court, every presumption in its favor is indulged .... " Green v. 
Frazier, 253 U.S. 233, 239 (1920). 
" [d. at 240. 
'" "A municipal corporation is a public institution created to promote public, as distin-
guished from private, objects. All its power, property and offices constitute a public trust to 
be administered by its authorities." 2 E.MCQUILLAN, MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS § 10.31 
(F.ELLARD 3d ed. 1966 Rev. Vol.). 
" See Fickes v. Missoula County, 155 Mont. 258, 268, 470 P.2d 287, 292 (1970); State ex 
reI. Hammermill Paper Co. v. La Plante, 58 Wis.2d 32, 56 n.8, 205 N.W .2d 784, 798 n.8 (1973). 
C{. Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 32 (1954), where the Supreme Court held that eminent 
domain, a municipal power subject to practically the same public purpose test as the taxing 
power, comes under the heading of state police power. 
" Compare, Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905), a classic example of a restrictive 
substantive due process test, with Stanley v. Dep't of Conservation and Dev., 284 N.C. 15, 
199 S.E.2d 641 (1973). For application of the less restrictive doctrines of substantive due 
process and public purpose, see Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502 (1934), and Wilson v. Bd. 
of County Comm'rs, 273 Md. 30, 327 A.2d 488 (1974). 
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trines have their constitutional base in the due process clause and 
each provides the judiciary with a broad substantive test of new 
government programs. 
The definition of a public purpose sharpens slightly when con-
trasted with a "private" purpose. The public must receive some 
benefit from the municipal act. 93 No apparent public benefit is pres-
ent if a municipality arbitrarily appropriates $1,000 for a private 
corporation.94 On the other hand, considerably less difficulty in find-
ing a public purpose exists when a municipality contracts with that 
corporation to b~ild a school or purchase a fire engine.95 Pollution 
control bonds fall somewhere in between; they are not an outright 
gift nor are they a contractual purchase of goods or services. Yet a 
private corporation is benefiting from municipal action and, argua-
bly, municipal funds are involved.96 
A number of issues arise when the public purpose doctrine is 
applied to pollution control bonds. The first issue is general in na-
ture, and arises whenever a court tests the validity of a statutory 
purpose: to what degree will the court require proof that the statute 
has a public purpose? State courts have generally refused to over-
rule legislative determinations of public purpose unless "clearly 
wrong" or "manifestly arbitrary and incorrect."97 The pollution con-
trol bond cases have also adopted this deferential approach.9s 
0:, "The right of the public to receive and enjoy the benefit of the use [of public funds] 
determines whether the use is public or private." 56 AM. JUR. 2d Municipal Corporations 
§ 230 (1971). 
" Opponents of the bonds could argue that, at the least, the bonds are on indirect appropri-
ation of municipal funds. See note 96, infra. 
" See 15 E. MCQUILLAN, MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS § 43.31 (J. LATTA 3rd ed. 1970 Rev. Vol.) 
for a list of municipal bonds issued for specific purposes which have been held to serve a 
public purpose . 
.. The argument has been made that the public purpose doctrine is inappropriate to test 
pollution control bonds because no public funds are involved. Wilson v. Bd. of County 
Comm'rs, 273 Md. 30, 43-44, 327 A.2d 488, 495 (1974) (court applied public purpose test 
without deciding whether bonds involved use of public funds because rule in Maryland is that 
exemptions from state taxation must serve a public purpose); State ex rel. Brennan v. Bow-
man, 89 Nev. 330, 332-33, 512 P.2d 1321, 1322 (1973) (court held that bonds did not constitute 
public funds spent for private purposes since no public funds were involved and because 
purpose was public). The difficulty with arguing that the public purpose doctrine is inappro-
priate because no public funds are involved is that the doctrine limits all municipal acts and 
not simply the power to tax or issue bonds. See note 82, supra. Second, even if the bond 
agreement provides that the corporation will pay all costs of issuing the bonds, presumably 
some public employee time will always exist which is not paid for by the corporation and 
which the municipality must cover. Thus, some public funds will always be involved. 
" 15 E. MCQUILLAN, MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS § 43.29 (J. LATTA 3rd ed. 1970 Rev. Vol.); 56 
AM. JUR. 2d Municipal Corporations § 230 (1971). 
" E.g., Harper v. Schooler, 258 S.C. 486, 496,189 S.E.2d 284,289 (1972) ("clearly wrong"); 
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Three other issues concern the various criteria by which the bonds 
are to be judged. First, do the bonds yield any public benefit and, 
if so, how much public benefit constitutes a public purpose? Equa-
tions have been offered: one commentator has suggested that, in 
general, a community must receive value proportionate to the value 
it gives. DD Another has gone further and concluded that a public 
purpose exists only when the community receives more in benefits 
than it gives to the private party. 100 
To the degree that either of these standards requires a court to 
weigh and compare private and public benefits, the court is impro-
perly assuming a legislative role. As noted, the public purpose doc-
trine is little more then a vague truism by which a court is able to 
substitute its evaluation of the statute's public benefit for that of 
the legislature. Basic questions of the existence or non-existence of 
a public benefit are political questions best answered by politi-
cians. IOI For that reason, the desirable public purpose test is the 
least restrictive one. By focusing solely on the validity of the purpose 
of the statute and avoiding a balancing of benefits, the courts are 
least likely to overrule judgements best made by legislators. A statu-
tory purpose should be considered "public" so long as it is not 
manifestly clear that the public will receive no benefit. 
The second issue raised by the public purpose test as applied to 
pollution control bonds concerns the judicial effect to be given the 
statutory means, that is, the use of tax-exempt bonds to provide 
direct financial aid to private corporations. Beginning with 
Sharpless the argument has been made and accepted that the exist-
ence of direct public aid to a private business or an individual pre-
State ex rei. Farmers' Electric Cooperative, Inc. v. State Environmental Improvement Au-
thority, 518 S.W.2d 68, 74 (Mo. 1975) ("arbitrary and unreasonable"); Wilson v. Bd. of 
County Comm'rs, 273 Md. 30, 49, 327 A.2d 488, 498 (1974) ("[Ilt is only necessary that the 
legislative determination to spend a particular amount of public funds be reasonable and 
based on an honest judgement ... that the expenditure is for the best interests of the city," 
quoting Williamsport v. Sanitary Dist., 247 Md. 326, 332, 231 A.2d 40, 44 (1967)) . 
.. Note, The "Public Purpose" of Municipal Financing For Industrial Development, 70 
YALE L.J. 789, 796 (1961). 
'00 Note, Restricting Revenue Bond Financing of Private Enterprise, 52 N.C.L. REV. 859, 
862 (1974). 
'0' One commentator has offered two characteristics of the appropriate "public purpose" 
decisionmaker: the capacity to make the most expert analysis and the ability to best deter-
mine what values are most important to the community in a given situation. This commenta-
tor concluded that the appropriate decisionmaker would usually not be a court, but offered 
several reasons why industrial development bonds may be an exception. Note, The "Public 
Purpose" Of Municipal Financing For Industrial Development, 70 YALE L.J. 789, 796-97 
(1961). 
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eludes any finding of a public purpose.102 Of the pollution control 
bond cases, only the North Carolina Supreme Court in Stanley v. 
Department of Conservation and Development lO3 has adopted this 
reasonmg. 
The final issue appears less frequently in the pollution control 
bond case law. Does a public purpose exist when the plant intending 
to use the bonds is, at the time, in violation of state pollution control 
regulations, has been ordered to comply, and apparently has the 
means to privately finance the required facilities? Industrial devel-
opment bonds were intended to encourage particular discretionary 
corporate action: relocation within or near the issuing municipality. 
But, in those cases where a plant is under a pre-existing obligation 
to provide pollution control facilities, arguably, no element of corpo-
rate discretion remains. 104 1f the city is entitled to receive that which 
it is issuing the bonds to acquire, are those bonds issued for a public 
purpose? The remainder of this artiele will discuss the majority view 
response to these issues, and Stanley. 
The principal task faced by the majority courts has been to deter-
mine what the purposes of the bonds are and whether those pur-
poses are "public." The courts have found two categories of public 
benefits, economic and environmental, each sufficient to constitute 
a public purpose. First, the courts have taken judicial notice and 
accepted legislative findings as to the positive economic effect of the 
bonds. The opinions cite as "public purpose benefits" the increased 
attractiveness of the area to new industry by virtue of the availabil-
ity of the bonds,105 decreased unemployment,106 and an increase in 
tax revenue. 107 
1112 To justify any exercise of the power [to levy taxes] requires that the expenditure 
which it is intended to meet shall be for some public service, or some object which concerns 
the public welfare. The promotion of the interest of individuals, either in respect of 
property or business, although it may result incidentally in the advancement of the public 
welfare, is, in its essential character, a private and not a public object. However certain 
and great the resulting good to the general public, it does not, by reason of its comparative 
importance, cease to be incidental. Lowell v. City of Boston, 111 Mass. 454, 460·61 (1873) 
(emphasis added). 
103 284 N.C. 15, 199 S.E.2d 641 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Stanley]. 
, •• Compare Peterson and Galper, supra note 2, at 84, where the authors argue that present 
federal laws allow corporations little discretion, with Roberts, River Basin Authorities: A 
National Solution to Water Pollution, 83 HARV. L. REV. 1527, 1530 (1970), where the author 
offers several reasons why a corporation might decide to delay compliance with pollution 
regulations. 
105 State ex rei. Brennan v. Bowman, 89 Nev. 330, 333, 512 P.2d 1321, 1322 (1973); State 
v. County Dev. Authority, 249 So.2d 6, 10 (Fla. 1971). 
10. State ex rei. Brennan v. Bowman, 89 Nev. 330, 333, 512 P.2d 1321, 1322 (1973); Fickes 
v. Missoula County, 155 Mont. 258, 268, 470 P.2d 287, 292 (1970). 
,.7 Fickes v. Missoula County, 155 Mont. 258, 268, 470 P.2d 287, 292 (1970). 
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In addition, several courts have indicated that the pollution con-
trol facilities need not create new sources of employment or increase 
tax revenue in order to serve a public purpose. The bonds will be 
valid even if they only maintain the present economic level. In State 
v. Putnam County Development Authority,IOS the state argued that 
the statute which authorized the bonds required a project to have a 
positive effect on the area economy, while the planned pollution 
control facilities would merely maintain the economic status quo. 
The court, which had already noted that the particular plant apply-
ing for the bonds employed an annual average of 2,500 people, 109 
disagreed: 
The economic contribution of the project is amply demonstrated in 
the trial judge's final judgement. He found that Hudson is one of the 
major industries located in Putnam County and provides employment 
opportunities to a large number of Putnam County inhabitants. The 
curtailment or termination of operations would cause Hudson to dis-
charge a large number of its employees, in an area where other, ready 
employment would not likely be available. ItO 
Another court has come to a similar conclusion, holding that the 
bonds served a public purpose by tying a plant already located in 
the state more closely to its present location. III 
The courts' determination of the economic benefits of pollution 
control bonds can be analyzed on two levels: whether tht conclu-
sions are factually correct and whether the result is judicially pro-
per. As to factual correctness, the experience with industrial devel-
opment bonds indicates that the bonds are unlikely to attract new 
industry.ll2 It is even debatable whether the bonds will stabilize a 
community's present economic level. For those marginally profita-
ble plants in danger of closing down, pollution control bonds may 
not promise sufficient savings to warrant any expenditures for the 
necessary pollution control facilities.1\3 
111' 249 So.2d 6 (Fla. 1971). 
111. Id. at 10. 
1111 Id. Hudson, the corporation, had until January 31, 1973 to comply with an order of the 
Florida Air and Water Pollution Control Commission. The court noted that failure to comply 
would subject Hudson to fines of up to $5,000 a day. 249 So.2d at 8. 
111 Wilson v. Bd. of County Comm'rs, 273 Md. 30, 51, 327 A.2d 488, 499 (1974). 
112 See note 26 supra and accompanying text. 
113 "[Ilt is difficult to believe that most industrial polluters just happen to be poised so 
close to the margin of decision that the small [tax] incentives that have been proposed will 
suddenly make cooperation rather than delay a preferred strategy in many instances." Rob-
erts, River Basin Authorities: A National Solution to Water Pollution, 83 HARV. L.REV. 1527, 
1532 (1970). 
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Nevertheless, exactly because it is at least debatable whether the 
bonds have any desirable economic effect indicates that the deci-
sions which find a public purpose are judicially correct. The court's 
role should be limited to examination of the statute's ultimate pur-
pose. Since the legislature's declared economic purposes are not 
manifestly arbitrary and unreasonable, the courts should inquire no 
further. 
The second type of public benefit from pollution control bonds, 
entirely aside from any economic benefits, is the resulting pollution 
control facilities which should abate or eliminate pollution in the 
community. The courts have held that pollution control per se is a 
public purpose,1I4 reasoning that the concept of public purpose is not 
static but a function of the increasing needs of the community. 115 In 
Wilson v. Board of County Commissioners of Allegheny County, 116 
the Maryland Supreme Court recognized that in an earlier time, 
pollution abatement may not have been considered a proper govern-
mental function. However, this court and others have found ample 
evidence that pollution control is presently a matter of great public 
concern and, thus, is a public purpose. ll7 
The courts' conclusion that the pollution control facilities will 
reduce pollution, as a factual matter, is less open to debate than the 
question of their economic effectiveness. Furthermore, the courts 
are correct to recognize that the public purpose doctrine, by defini-
tion, must be an expanding concept. For that reason, public concern 
over pollution is a valid basis for a court to find that pollution 
control programs have a public purpose. Nevertheless, having con-
cluded that pollution control is a public purpose, few of th.e courts 
have gone on to consider whether it is relevant that the corporate 
borrower may be under order to provide the facilities for which it 
seeks financing,lls This lack of discussion may be explained by the 
'14 Harper v. Schooler, 258 S.C. 486, 496, 189 S.E.2d 284, 289 (1972); Opinion of the Jus-
tices, 359 Mass. 769, 772, 268 N.E.2d 149, 151 (1971); Kennecott Copper Corp. v. Town of 
Hurley, 84 N.M. 743, 745, 507 P.2d 1074, 1076 (1973). 
115 State ex rei. Farmers' Electric Cooperative, Inc. v. State Environmental Improvement 
Authority, 518 S.W.2d 68, 74 (Mo. 1975); Wilson v. Bd. of County Comm'rs, 273 Md. 30, 46, 
327 A.2d 488, 496 (1974); State ex rei. Hammermill Paper Co. v. La Plante, 58 Wis.2d 32, 
55,205 N.W.2d 784,798 (1973). 
"' 273 Md. 30, 327 A.2d 488 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Wilson]. 
III [d. at 46, 327 A.2d at 496; State ex rei. Farmers' Electric Cooperative, Inc. v. State 
Environmental Improvement Authority, 518 S.W.2d 68, 74 (Mo. 1975); Kennecott Copper 
Corp. v. Town of Hurley, 84 N.M. 743, 745, 507 P.2d 1074, 1076 (1973). 
II. For instances where the corporate borrower was not in compliance with governmental 
pollution control regulations, see generally Harper v. Schooler, 258 S.C. 486, 491, 189 S.E.2d 
284,286 (1972); Stanley v. Dep't of Conservation and Dev., 284 N.C. 15, 22, 199 S.E.2d 641, 
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courts' approach: once a public purpose has been found how the 
legislature chose to pursue that purpose is immaterial. More impor-
tantly, if one purpose of the bonds is to induce corporate compliance 
with pollution control regulations quickly and without economic 
chaos, those plants already under order to comply are the most 
logical candidates for the bonds.ll9 
In Wilson, the taxpayer-appellant argued that the existence of 
such an order to comply negated any finding that pollution control 
is a public purpose. The court disagreed. It found that the purpose 
of the Maryland statute and § 103(c)(4)(F) of the Internal Revenue 
Code was to assist corporations to meet a given goal. 120 The court 
appeared to be influenced by what it considered to be the public 
stake in reaching that goal. Insofar as the purpose of the statute was 
pollution control, the court went to great lengths to demonstrate the 
"interest of vast portions of our populace in matters of 
environment, "121 and noted that without such interest the facilities 
would have never been required in the first place. Although not 
mentioned in the court's discussion of this issue, the Wilson opinion 
began by commenting on the importance to the county of the plant 
as an employer .122 In short, the court saw the public as having an 
interest in ensuring that employers are financially able to comply 
with pollution control regulations, which in turn, the public has an 
interest in having enforced. Thus, the existence of a compliance 
order would not lessen the statute's public purpose. 
Arguably, although a compliance order alone will not negate a 
public purpose, it should have a negative effect if a corporation 
under order is able to privately finance the required facilities. 123 A 
court that would strike down a statute for failing to include restric-
tions as to who may apply for the bonds would be saying, pollution 
control bonds for small corporations or those without adequate fi-
646 (1973); State v. County Dev. Authority, 249 So.2d 6, 8 (Fla. 1971); Wilson v. Bd. of 
Comm'rs, 273 Md. 30, 37, 327 A.2d 488, 492 (1974). 
"' The California pollution control bond statute specifically gives a higher priority to those 
projects necessary to meet federal, state, or local deadlines for controlling pollution created 
by already-existing facilities. CAL. HEALTH AND SAFETY CODE § 39616 (West Supp. 1975), 
amending CAL. HEALTH AND SAFETY CODE § 39616 (West 1973). 
120 [d. at 52, 327 A.2d at 499. 
121 [d. at 47, 327 A.2d at 497. 
122 "The Company has a plant at Luke in Allegheny County. Its 2,OOO-man payroll is of 
substantial importance to a county with a population as reflected by the 1970 census of 
approximately 84,000 people." 273 Md. at 32, 327 A.2d at 489-90. 
123 The statute discussed in Opinion of the Justices, 359 Mass. 769, 268 N.E.2d 149 (1971), 
required a state official to certify that the applicant for the loan was unable to construct the 
facilities without the assistance of the state. Mass. Acts 1970, ch. 746, § 1. 
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nancing do serve a public purpose, but pollution control bonds for 
Exxon do not. The difficulty with this approach is twofold. First, it 
puts a court in the position of either examining the balance sheet 
of each corporate user whose bonds are being challenged, or holding 
the statute invalid on its face. The second difficulty is that it ignores 
the legislative purpose of the statute which is to abate pollution and 
avoid economic dislocation. A legislature could reasonably have 
concluded that the quickest way to induce compliance with pollu-
tion regulations is to offer an economic incentive. Correctly applied, 
the public purpose doctrine should avoid testing the means of im-
plementation chosen by the legislature. 
A number of courts have commented on this ends/means distinc-
tion in another context: the legislative choice to provide direct aid 
to private corporations as the method for stabilizing the local econ-
omy and cleaning the environment. Discussions of this issue have 
included occasionally confusing and contradictory statements about 
direct and indirect benefit, primary and incidental beneficiaries, 
and ultimate and secondary purposes. 124 
First, pollution control bonds are clearly a source of direct aid and 
benefit to the corporate borrowers, as contrasted with the indirect 
benefit which all industry receives from the existence of a state 
vocational school, or even the benefit which one particular plant 
may receive from the construction of a nearby highway. Rather, the 
municipality provides direct assistance to the corporation with the 
intent that the resulting corporate action benefit the public. The 
courts have held that the existence of this direct private benefit does 
not per se preclude a finding of public purpose. The focus has been 
on the ultimate purpose of the bonds, whether the court has deter-
mined it to be unemployment reduction or pollution abatement, 
and not on the "private" status of the catalyst. If the ultimate 
purpose of the bonds is valid, then regardless of the private benefits 
conferred by the bonds, the public is considered the primary benefi-
ciary.l25 In other words, the intent or "purpose" of the legislature 
controls, not an objective determination of who gains most. 
IZ. Compare State v. County Dev. Authority, 249 So.2d 6, 12 (Fla. 1971); State ex ret. 
Farmers' Electric Cooperative, Inc. v. State Environmental Improvement Authority, 518 
S.W.2d 68, 72 (Mo. 1975); Opinion of the Justices, 359 Mass. 769, 771, 268 N.E.2d 149, 151 
(1971); Stanley v. Dep't of Conservation and Dev., 284 N.C. 15,38, 199 S.E.2d 641,656 (1973). 
, .. "The mere fact that the money raised will go to individuals will not condemn the act in 
question, since the test is not as to who receives the money, but, is the purpose for which it 
is to be expended a public purpose?" Fickes v. Missoula County, 155 Mont. 258, 268, 470 P.2d 
287, 292 (1970), quoting Kraus v. Riley, 107 Mont. 116, 124, 80 P.2d 864, 867 (1938). 
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Again, the courts are correct to limit their determination to the 
validity of the bond's ultimate purpose. Statutory authorization of 
pollution control bonds raises the presumption that the legislature 
has concluded that loaning the proceeds of tax-exempt revenue 
bonds to private corporations is an effective way for a municipality 
to acquire certain public benefits. The public purpose doctrine has 
been criticized for stifling new government programs. 126 By focusing 
on means as well as purpose, a court would be setting an improper 
restriction on state government. Stanley v. Department of Conser-
vation and Development is an excellent example of that form of 
judicial restriction. 
In Stanley, the court prefaced its discussion of the case with an 
outline of the public purpose doctrine as established by North Caro-
lina precedent. First, an activity cannot be for a public purpose 
unless it is properly the "business of government." A proper func-
tion of government is not to aid a private business unless the private 
sector has shown its unwillingness or inability to meet a public 
need. 127 Second, aid to a private business by tax-exempt revenue 
bonds is not justified by the "incidental" advantage to the public 
which results from the prosperity and promotion of private enter-
prise. Third, in determining public purpose, the court will look not 
only at the end sought by the statute but at the means to be used. 
The court questioned two aspects of the planned issuance of pol-
lution control bonds: their necessity and their form. In Mitchell v. 
North Carolina Industrial Development Financing Authority,128 the 
same court had struck down an industrial development bond statute 
because, in part, it could not find any need for the bonds sufficient 
to warrant government aid to private corporations. The court took 
judicial notice that no widespread unemployment existed in the 
state and that the North Carolina economy was still expanding. 129 
Similarly, in Stanley, the court was unable to find a need for pollu-
tion control bonds. Pollution control facilities are simply another 
cost of doing business which a corporation must include in the price 
of its goods. 130 More specifically, the court could find no element of 
"inability or unwillingness" on the part of private enterprise: 
,2ft Holmberg, Municipal Powers and the Public Purpose Doctrine, 21 RoCKY MT. L. REv. 
277 (1949); Tew, Industrial Bond Financing and the Florida Public Purpose Doctrine, 21 U. 
MIAMI L. REV. 171 (1966). 
127 As an example of that type of situation, the court cited two instances in which it had 
upheld revenue bonds issued by public housing authorities for low income housing. 284 N.C. 
at 33, 199 S.E.2d at 653. 
'2K 273 N.C. 137, 159 S.E.2d 745 (1968). 
'211 Id. at 156, 159 S.E.2d at 758. 
'30 284 N.C. at 38, 199 S.E.2d at 656. 
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There is no finding that Albemarle [the corporation] is unable to pro-
vide the required facilities at its own expense and without outside assis-
tance. Indeed, upon the argument of these cases, defendant conceded 
that Albemarle is able to correct the pollution it creates and that con-
struction of the necessary facilities is in progress. 131 
The court did not limit its holding to those cases where the corpo-
ration is able privately to finance the required facilities. It indicated 
that pollution control bonds are prohibited by the public purpose 
doctrine even where a corporation is unable to comply with a state 
order without state aid and the only alternative is to cease opera-
tions. '32 
The rationale of this holding that, in effect, pollution control 
bonds can never serve a public purpose, is the court's determination 
that the form of the transaction rather than its ultimate purpose is 
controlling. The court readily conceded that pollution is a major 
social problem and that pollution control is necessary for the public 
health, safety, and welfare. '33 Unlike the majority view courts, the 
Stanley court stated that the existence of a public purpose per se is 
insufficient: "[d]irect assistance to a private entity may not be the 
means used to effect a public purpose."134 Direct assistance to a 
private corporation can only yield an incidental benefit to the pub-
lic, notwithstanding the legislative purpose of the statute or the 
amount of public benefit. 
In a Massachusetts advisory opinion, the primary and incidental 
beneficiaries were determined in light of the statute's principal pur-
pose.135 The Massachusetts court determined that purpose to be 
pollution control rather than subsidization of private indust-ry. Con-
sequently, the primary beneficiary was the public and not the corpo-
rate borrower. In Stanley, however, the court equated "direct recipi-
ent" with "primary beneficiary." "The conclusion is inescapable 
131 Id. 
132 Id. at 39, 199 S.E.2d at 657. 
133 Id. at 36, 199 S.E.2d at 655. In this context, the court distinguishes between the state 
police power to regulate pollution levels and the state taxing power. The court notes that the 
former is more extensive than the latter and concludes that a state can eliminate pollution 
through use of regulations and sanctions but not by assisting a corporation to finance the cost 
of the required facilities. 284 N.C. at 37, 199 S.E.2d at 656. The validity of a distinction 
between police power and taxing power is questionable. Many elements of a pollution control 
regulatory scheme could require government expenditures and thus, taxation. For example, 
the state would probably purchase testing equipment and hire inspectors. In fact, the expense 
of regulation could exceed the minimal municipal expenses required to issue pollution control 
bonds. 
I" 284 N.C. at 34, 199 S.E.2d at 653. 
135 Opinion of the Justices, 359 Mass. 769, 771, 268 N.E.2d 149,151 (1971). 
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that Albemarle is the only direct beneficiary of the tax-exempt reve-
nue bonds. . . and that the benefit to the public is only incidental 
or secondary."136 For a bond to have a public purpose the public 
must be the direct recipient of the funds; private enterprise cannot 
serve as a catalyst. 
The North Carolina court concluded that pollution control bonds 
are not properly "the business of government." It is noteworthy that 
Stanley represented the second time the North Carolina legislature 
had passed industrial development or pollution control bond legisla-
tion. 137 Where such a clear and continuing conflict over the question 
of public purpose is present, the presumption should favor the legis-
lative determination. Stanley recognized that the concept of public 
purpose "must expand ... to meet the necessities of changed times 
and conditions .... "138 The court then confused issues when it 
deviated from consideration of the statutory purpose to the statu-
tory means. As a result of decisions such as Stanley, the North 
Carolina legislature is barred from pursuing a number of concededly 
public purposes because of the use of direct public aid to private 
corporations. 139 . 
The relationship between the credit clause restriction and the 
public purpose test is helpful for unraveling statutory means from 
purpose. As has been suggested, the courts use the public purpose 
doctrine act inappropriately when they seek more than a rational 
basis for pollution control bond statutes. This test would be satisfied 
by a finding that pollution control and economic stabilization are 
the statutory purposes and are reasonably likely to yield some pub-
lic benefit. But state courts are not foreclosed from also testing the 
statutory means, since the very purpose of the credit restriction is 
to examine the means chosen and to identify loans to private corpo-
rations resulting in municipal debt or liability. Neither the credit 
'''0 284 N.C. at 38, 199 S.E.2d at 656. 
137 In Mitchell v. Indus. Dev. Fin. Authority, 273 N.C. 137, 159 S.E.2d 745 (1968), the court 
struck down a statute authorizing the issuance of industrial development bonds. Since 
Stanley, the North Carolina General Assembly has passed a constitutional amendment au-
thorizing industrial development and pollution control bonds. N.C. SESS. LAws 1973, ch. 1222. 
'" 284 N.C. at 33, 199 S.E.2d at 653. 
13. See Foster v. Medical Care Comm'n, 283 N.C. 110, 195 S.E.2d 517 (1973), where the 
court struck down a statute authorizing the North Carolina Medical Care Commission to 
issue revenue bonds to finance hospital construction. The statute provided that the hospitals 
could be leased to private non-profit corporations which would acquire title to the hospitals 
after retiring the bonds through rent payments. The court held that the statute had no 
purpose apart from the operation of the hospital by, and the ultimate conveyance to, the 
private lessee and therefore lacked a public purpose. 283 N.C. at 127, 195 S.E.2d at 528. 
360 ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS [Vol. 5:333 
restriction nor the public purpose test, however, should be read so 
broadly as to subsume the function of the other. 
CONCLUSION 
Pollution control bonds today have much in common with in-
dustrial development bonds just prior to the 1968 tax reform: pollu-
tion control bond sales have increased dramatically over a short 
period of time and are presently being used by major corporations 
for large projects; 140 the great majority of states are issuing the bonds 
and the case law suggests that very few state courts will find them 
invalid. l41 
In addition to statistical similarities, pollution control bonds are 
subject to many of the same criticisms which were aimed at in-
dustrial development bonds. From an economic point of view, the 
bonds are still growing in volume and continue to compete with 
general obligation bonds, causing the interest rate on all municipal 
bonds to rise, with the attendant detrimental effect on municipal 
budgets. The bonds also create the same loss of federal tax revenue, 
quantitatively and qualitatively, as industrial development 
bonds.J42 Finally, from an environmental point of view, a number of 
commentators have questioned the effectiveness of using tax incen-
tives to induce corporate compliance with pollution control regula-
tions. 143 
In short, many of the same abuses and failings which prompted 
the original 1968 reform have reappeared, and the federal 
government will probably act soon to limit the volume of pollution 
control bonds. The Secretary of the Treasury has indicated his de-
sire to limit use of the bonds to financing new facilities added to 
plants in operation before January 1, 1975,144 and the Treasury has 
recently released new proposed regulations regarding pollution con-
u. In 1975, the average pollution control bond issue equaled $11,057,689. The Weekly Bond 
Buyer, Jan. 26, 1976, at 10, col. 1. 
'" Thirty-four states or their political subdivisions issued pollution control bonds in 1975. 
Id. 
14' It has been estimated that by 1980, the public will pay $1.5 billion per year in tax loss 
and higher interest payments on public debt in order to reduce private industrial pollution 
control investment by $550 million annually. The rest of the public cost will go directly to 
bondholders as higher income. Peterson and Galper, supra note 2, at 82. 
'43 Reitze and Reitze, Tax Incentives Don't Stop Pollution, 57 A.B.A.J. 127 (1971); McDan-
iel and Kaplinsky, The Use of the Federal Income Tax System to Combat Air And Water 
Pollution: A Case Study In Tax Expenditures, 1 ENV. AFF. 12 (1971); Note, The Limited Tax-
Exempt Status of Interest on Industrial Development Bonds Under Subsection 103(c) of the 
Internal Revenue Code, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1649 (1972). 
'44 Tax Notes, July 14, 1975, at 16. 
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trol bond use which are considered more restrictive than the present 
regulations. u5 Nevertheless, hopeful reformers should not con-
sider state courts as the source of one solution to the pollution con-
trol bond problem. An effective solution, if one is desired, must 
originate in Congress or with the Treasury. 
'" Proposed Treas. Reg. § 1.103-8, 40 Fed. Reg. 36371 (1975). 
